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ABSTRACT: Han Fei was one of the main proponents of Legalism in Qin-era China. 
Although his works are mostly read from a historic perspective, the aim of this paper is to 
advance an interpretation of Han Fei as a “social scientist”. The social sciences are the 
fields of academic scholarship that study society and its institutions as a consequence of 
human behavior. Methodologically, social sciences combine abstract approaches in model-
building with empiric investigations, seeking to prove the functioning of the models. In a third 
step, social sciences also aim at providing policy advice. Han Fei can be read as operating 
similarly. First, he builds a model of the nature of men, the state, and its interconnections, 
and then he uses history as empiric ground to prove his models. Again, after studying society 
as a “raw fact”, Han Fei develops models on how to deal with “society”. This article 
examines the “social scientific” inclinations of Han Fei by re-reading Chapter 49 of his book 
and applying an analysis in “historical correspondence”. This article serves as a case-study 
in this new type of analysis that can prove fruitful for the advancement of comparative 
philosophy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Han Fei (韓非, 280? – 233 b.c.e.) was one of the main proponents of Legalism in 
Qin-era China. Although his works are mostly read from a historic perspective, the 
aim of this paper is to advance an interpretation of Han Fei as a “social scientist” in a 
sense that still has to be developed. The social sciences are the fields of academic 
scholarship that study society and its institutions as a consequence of human behavior. 
Methodologically, social sciences combine abstract approaches in model-building 
with empiric investigations, seeking to prove the functioning of the models. In a third 
step, social sciences also aim at providing policy advice. 
  Can Han Fei be read as operating similarly? If the answer to this question is to be  
positive, a three-step approach should be identified in his work. First, Han Fei would  
________________________ 
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have to have analyzed the social reality he was dealing with. This entails identifying 
behavior, structures, and interconnections. Second, he would have had to test his 
analysis empirically, and, third, he would have had to derive his policy advice from 
his analysis and its empirical testing. The first challenge to become apparent when 
answering the question above is the historicity of the author. Obviously, the term 
“social science” applies to a specific range of modern academic disciplines. Therefore, 
applying the term to Han Fei automatically entails some sort of anachronism; this 
means, applying terms outside their historical contexts. This however, does not make 
the enterprise impossible. Following Boff (1983), it is possible to construct a 
parallelism as follows: The meaning of being a social scientist with regard to today’s 
standard of the academic discourse corresponds to Han Fei’s social philosophy in 
relation to the standard of scholarly discourse in his time. 
This “historical correspondence” allows the re-reading of a classic or ancient text 
in today’s academic context. It is, however, always a construct, meaning that it 
departs from the original text, evaluated from a scientific perspective. It does not 
mean that Han Fei actually thought like a social scientist, or even that he wanted to 
practice social science. The “historical correspondence” allows a certain type of 
interpretation by comparing two relationships: The thinker being analyzed in the 
context of his time or culture and similar philosophies/approaches today in the 
context of our time or culture. 
Even if this article is concerned with a specific Chinese philosopher, this 
technique of establishing a “historical correspondence” may prove a fruitful approach 
in comparative philosophy. It would allow not only comparing different philosophies 
across the cultural border but also over the historical timeframe. This technique also 
anchors the comparative approach to a specific context: It claims that a set of 
thoughts has to be analyzed and interpreted within the historical and cultural context 
in which it was formulated As such, “historical correspondence” allows a 
comparative approach but also expands the comparison to take the relevant context 
into consideration. Therefore, readers interested in Chinese philosophy will find an 
article about the philosopher Han Fei. Readers interested in comparative philosophy 
will find a case-study for the application of “historical correspondence”. 
In order to set up the comparative framework: What did it mean in Qin-era China 
to be a legalist? The objective of the legalist philosophers (fa-jia 法家) was to 
strengthen the position of the state or his ruler (jun 君, a duke or king, later the 
emperor).1 According to Ivanhoe (2011) and Harris (2011), an important instrument 
of the ruler's power were the ministers and officials (chen 臣) as a bureaucratic elite. 
The ruler had to employ the ministers by using their strength for himself and by 
countering their intrigues against himself. Furthermore, other bureaucratic measures 
like unifying weights and measures, promulgating law codes, registering households, 
collecting taxes, and recruiting men for official work and for the army were some of 
the other handles of state the rulers were to apply. It is important to remember that for 
Han Fei, society and state meant the same. 
                                                
1 Legalism is a broad but perhaps wrongly-used term. For a more precise analysis see Goldin 2011. 
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This paper uses the traditional text, Han-Fei-Zi, and re-interprets it in a modern 
approach as “historical correspondence”. This paper is an attempt to read Han Fei in a 
specific sense. In order to do so, the awareness of two problems is imperative. First, it 
cannot be claimed that Han Fei originally intended to be a social scientist in the 
modern sense – or perhaps in any sense – of the expression. Most probably, the 
thinker wasn’t even a self-conscientious philosopher, but an active member of the 
ruling class providing counsel to monarchs. Second, there is the issue of clarifying the 
idea of social science employed. Here again, two possibilities emerge: On a strong 
claim, Han Fei can be read as a “social scientist”. On a weaker claim, he can be read 
as practicing social science. 
The difference between these two claims will be explained in the first section of 
this paper. The examination of textual evidence and philosophical argumentation will 
be delivered in a second section. Finally, a third section will examine what it could 
mean today – in a constructive engagement – to read Han Fei along the lines 
described above. 
 
2. WHAT IS SOCIAL SCIENCE? 
 
In a first, simple approach, the Merriam-Webster (2011) dictionary defines social 
science as “a branch of science that deals with the institutions and functioning of 
human society and with the interpersonal relationships of individuals as members of 
society” and “a science (such as anthropology or social psychology) dealing with a 
particular phase or aspect of human society”. 
Similarly, UK’s Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC, 2011) states that  
 
Social science is, in its broadest sense, the study of society and the manner in which 
people behave and influence the world around us. Social scientists shape our lives usually 
without us even being aware. The role of governments in an increasingly market-based 
society, for example, has been determined by famous thinkers such as John Maynard 
Keynes and Karl Popper. It was an economist who first dreamt up the idea of National 
Health Service. And the payment of billions of pounds of state benefits for the needy has 
been influenced by the work of social scientists. 
 
Both definitions seem to imply that human relationship creates a reality of its own. 
Whereas the first gives emphasis to institutions and their functioning, the second 
focuses on human behavior and asserts that social science serves analytical purposes. 
However, social sciences also have a normative dimension. It is the outcomes of 
social sciences like sociology, economics and jurisprudence that justify or induce 
social institutions, regulations and norms. In both definitions, there is a sense of a 
social reality – similar, albeit not argued for, to Searle’s later work of social facts 
(Searle 1995) – which on the one hand is created by human interaction and on the 
other hand in itself influences social behavior. In other words, social science has an 
analytical as well as a normative side. 
What do social scientists do? They aspire to science about social facts – which is 
to say, they intend to study human action in a systematic, rigorous, evidence-based, 
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falsifiable, replicable, generalizable, non-subjective, transparent, skeptical, rational, 
frequently causal, and cumulative fashion (Gerring 2012).2 Of course, social science 
is a broad concept encompassing a wide range of different disciplines like 
anthropology, law, political science, education, economics, or sociology (Byrne 1998); 
not all use the same methods, and not all value the same approach to their specific 
subjects. Whereas some (economics, political science, sociology) employ quantitative 
methods, others (anthropology, history) use a qualitative approach. Flyvbjerg (2001) 
urges all social scientists to employ both – qualitative and quantitative – approaches. 
He puts more emphasis on qualitative accounts, however, since he considers them to 
“matter more”. 
Is there a difference between being a social scientist and practicing social science? 
At a first glance, the social scientist is conscious of being an academician dedicated to 
a specific branch of science. Usually, social scientists are focused on the rigor of the 
methods they employ, for since the “Methodenstreit”, there has been considerable 
quarrel over the question whether there is a specific social-scientific methodology 
(Winch 1990, 66-71). Furthermore, social scientists are aware of the normative 
character of their research, and due to the double-nature of social science, they try to 
discern analytical from normative factors when researching (Winch 1990, 73-75). 
Therefore, to claim that a given person is a social scientist implies that this person is 
aware of these characteristics and the person qua scientist follows the rigor of being 
an academician working on a double-natured field. It is not easy to identify when 
which nature of the field comes into question and when they are questionable. While 
descriptive science has academic rigor, the description occurs within normative 
parameters. There is instrumental normativity instructing research and disciplines 
towards efficiency, the standards of rigor etc. This type of normativity is accepted and 
needed. The second type consists of value judgments; usually, it is considered that 
they should not influence the practice of social science. 
Stating that Han Fei was a social scientist is a strong claim – too strong to hold, 
since the legalist didn’t seem to be aware of working as a scientist and had never 
meant to separate analytical from normative claims.3 In fact, his enmity towards 
intellectualism strongly suggests that he was no social-scientist and didn’t consider 
himself to be a scholar.4 
This paper contemplates whether Han Fei practiced social science. This entails 
treating human society as a factual reality and its institutions and outcomes as social 
                                                
2  For a compendium of definitions from prominent writers see: www.gly.uga.edu/railsback/ 
1122sciencedefns.html. For work addressing the meaning of science in a more nuanced and extended 
fashion see Laudan 1983, Schaffer 1997. Evidently, there is disagreement over how to define science, 
and over the utility of the scientific ideal - however defined. For critical views, see Barnes and Bloor 
1982, Feyerabend 1978, Harding 1986 and 1987, Latour and Woolgar 1979, Shulamit 1992, Woolgar 
1988. 
3 JeeLoo Liu argues in different papers (e.g. 2011) that the separation of fact and value is not made in 
Chinese philosophy and is in itself a bold claim. 
4 A good proof of this is the end of Chapter 49 of the Han-Fei-Zi in which scholars are the first group 
of vermin. Of course, he meant Ruist (Confucian) scholars, but his general anti-intellectualism also 
leads him to condone ministers, speech-makers and other typically intellectual groups. 
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facts. Social facts can be easily described as a reality created only by social 
interaction. An example of social fact is money. It is a factual reality that is created by 
the interaction of people (Searle 1995). To practice social science is to think about 
these matters in a systematic, rigorous, evidence-based, falsifiable, replicable, 
generalizable, non-subjective, rational, and causal way, as specified above. Practicing 
social science does not necessarily oblige the academician to scientific rigor in his 
demeanor. In this sense, it is a much weaker claim than stating that Han Feiwas a 
social scientist, and yet it points to something important: It entails that he at least 
analyzed society carefully and within the constraints of society itself, i.e. without 
regress to ontological or cosmological principles. The next section intends to make 
this reading of Han Fei plausible. 
 
3. READING HAN FEI 
 
In this section, the argument for Han Fei as practicing social science is going to be 
made. Methodologically, in order to make this argument, the concept of “historical 
correspondence” will be put in use. It is important, therefore, to understand the 
practice of social science under a double caveat. First, it is always meant in the sense 
of “historical correspondence”, i.e. in the sense of comparing the relationship of 
social science with today’s academic standard to Han Fei’s thoughts in relation to his 
epoch’s social standard. The second caveat is an understanding of the practice of 
social science in the broad sense, as outlined above; i.e. thinking about human 
society’s actions in a systematic, rigorous, evidence-based, falsifiable, replicable, 
generalizable, non-subjective, transparent, skeptical, rational, frequently causal, and 
cumulative fashion. In order to do so, some exemplary passages of the text will be 
used to analyze Han Fei’s argumentation. 
The texts or passages analyzed below are considered to be exemplary for the work 
of Han Fei. They were chosen on two grounds: Either they are well-known and often 
quoted by today’s works on Han Fei, comparative philosophy, and Chinese 
philosophy, or they are important for Han Fei himself, meaning that the overall work 
refers to these passages. In both contexts, this article does not intend to enter into 
sinologists’ debates about composition of the texts and authenticity of various 
chapters in the book by Han Fei. The overall argument is not affected by the fact that 
the book was not written by one person but is the product of an evolution, since Han 
Fei can easily be understood and interpreted as a school of thought within Legalism. 
If sinology should expose the work as a multi-layered text with different authors, then 
the re-reading offered here would only change in so far as the authors (instead of the 
author) of Han Fei will be interpreted as having practiced social science (see Smith 
2003). 
 
3.1 THE GENERAL AND REPLICABLE 
 
One of the best known allegories in the Han-Fei-Zi is the following:  
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A man from Song was plowing his field, which had within it a tree stump. A rabbit ran 
through his field, crashing into the stump, breaking its neck, and dying. At this point, the 
man from Song laid down his plough and kept watch over the tree stump, hoping that he 
would get another rabbit. However, getting another rabbit in this manner was impossible, 
and so this man became the laughingstock of the state of Song. As such, if one desires to 
govern the people of the present age by means of the governing methods of the former 
kings, this is the same as keeping watch over the tree stump. HFZ 49/145/19-21 (Watson 
2003, 98) 
 
As a metaphor, the story is illuminating. However, does it hold a social-scientific 
point? Han Fei’s primary concern is how to govern. He is looking to provide the 
monarch with instruments for ruling a state; the instruments to be employed must 
work, i.e., once applied, they must always produce the same outcome. In other words, 
Han Fei is looking for a causal system. The rabbit running through the field and 
crashing into the stump is contingent and thus does not qualify. For Han Fei, 
analyzing events as they are is an important part of his activity as a thinker and 
counselor, because it is from this analysis that he can discern the causal, i.e. the 
necessary, from the contingent. 
In this text example, Han Fei is criticizing a view on ruling that relies on history 
and experience. The author makes a point of differentiating between what happens 
randomly and what happens because constructed, man-made conditions make it likely 
to happen. It is important to note that the man from Song does not set up a trap; he 
just waits for something to happen, i.e., he is not applying himself to change his 
environment in order to allow for more rabbits to come or be caught. For Han Fei, 
rulers have the ability to influence society; this ability goes even so far as to create a 
whole system of interacting relationships that enable desirable outcomes to 
materialize. It is certainly anachronistic to think of Han Fei as reflecting on causality, 
but in the sense of “historical correspondence”, it is safe to assume that he wanted to 
create a system that creates replicable situations with replicable outcomes. He did not 
want this to be based on possibilities, he aimed for certainty.5  
In this passage, Han Fei turns his argument skeptically against history and makes 
three relevant points. First, the past may be a guide, but one must carefully scrutinize 
whether it still fits into the reality of present-day human society. Second, the methods 
employed for governing must be non-subjective, since they are not to be bent to the 
monarch’s will, but the ruler has to utilize them according to the social realities he 
sees himself involved in (the monarch does not influence social reality (first layer) 
around himself, he creates a more potent social reality (second layer) that he can 
apply for dealing with the first layer). Third, the desire to govern alone is not 
sufficient for governing; it is the employment of certain methods – social facts 
themselves – that empowers the ruler. 
                                                
5 An even stronger claim could be made: In the sense of the paragraph, Han Fei has the idea of 
applying interlinked instruments according to a standard core concept of what is commonly called 
causality. Of course, this does not follow from the above and it still needs a more in-depth argument. 
This, however, is not in the scope of this article. 
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3.2 HISTORY AND ADAPTATION 
 
Han Fei does not only create a system for governing; he is not only dedicated to 
social and political philosophy, he is also devoted to studying historic realities. His 
main interest is to learn from history and adapt some of the once successful 
stratagems. On the other hand, he is also very skeptical about accepting historical 
facts or even history in itself as a guiding principle. For example: 
 
So, if people were to praise the ways of [the ancient sages] Yao, Shun, Tang, Wu, and Yu 
in the present age, they would certainly be laughed at by new sages. Therefore, [true] 
sages do not expect to follow antiquity, nor do they take as their model an unchanging 
standard of what is acceptable. They examine the affairs of their age and make 
preparations based on these. HFZ 49/145/17-19 (Watson 2003, 98) 
 
Here again, Han Fei makes two points: First, he uses the classic term “sage” but 
gives it a new meaning. The gentleman does not hold to history for its own sake, but 
the true gentleman (or the intelligent man) is the one that succeeds in adapting the 
standards and making them into something useful to him. This statement – poietic 
itself – presupposes the idea of a reasoning person who is able to make evidence-
based judgments despite his liking or disliking of the evidence and despite the 
evidence accommodating virtue, the good, or even depravation. This deserves 
attention, since it hints at descriptive versus normative approaches. For Han Fei, it 
does not seem to be important which value-judgment one associates with historic 
developments, but it is important what history can teach in relation to actual 
circumstances. Han Fei presupposes an analytical separation between the narration of 
history and the moral content the recipient associates with the narrative. 
Second, but similar to the above, Han Fei takes the actual state of (social) affairs 
to be a base for the development of a causal system on how to influence them. 
Making preparations – as the text suggests – could be read as setting the standards 
and their interrelations in order to use the handles of society or the state. Setting 
uniform standards is necessary for “taming” the constant change social systems go 
through. Or, mirroring the argument above, since the 1st layer of social reality is 
highly dynamic, the 2nd layer is able to analyze and transform it into a more stable 
frame of reference. The social system and its changing character are made clear in the 
following text:  
 
In general, those who object to varying the old do so because they fear to make changes 
in the face of people’s contentment. Those who do not vary the old are carrying on in the 
footsteps of disorder. Those who satisfy the people’s hearts throw off the restraints to 
people’s wicked behavior. If people are stupid and do not understand [what results in] 
disorder, and if the ruler is weak and cannot implement change, this results in a failure of 
order. As for a [true] ruler, his clear-sightedness enables him to understand [the 
conditions of] order. His severity is such that he will certainly implement it, and so, even 
if he goes against the hearts of the people, he will establish order. HFZ 18/31/19-21 
(Watson 2003, 95) 
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In contrast to the passages quoted before, Han Fei does not employ the anecdote 
as a figure here, something typical for his style. This in itself may have meaning. On 
the one hand, anecdotes are used to make texts readable and were (and are) widely 
employed in Chinese literature. On the other hand, for Han Fei, the different stories 
he tells also serve as empirical proof of his different points. As a thinker, he seems to 
be aware that there are abstract arguments, but that these arguments must be mirrored 
by the social facts they try to describe. The anecdotes he employs illustrate the social 
facts and their relations as they were explained in the abstract argument. It may be 
that Han Fei did not have a concept of representativeness for the different stories he 
tells, but he seems to deem them reliable, for he not only gives them weight in his 
statements, he also tells anecdotes that may contradict his thesis, analyzing them and 
showing that, all things considered, the prima-facie contradiction doesn’t hold. 
The passage quoted above features two main arguments. First, the non-
subjectivity of the ruler is emphasized. Not only may he not apply the handles of the 
state according to his sympathies, but he is also required to recognize the state in 
which the system is, since the system will not adapt itself to his desires. Here, Han 
Fei requires the ruler to bend – epistemically – to the social facts. Again, he separates 
the first layer of social reality (what happens) from the second layer (which 
instruments to employ) and from personal preferences or value-judgment. 
Second, the legalist addresses behavior not as something to be judged by morality, 
but as something real that cannot be trained away, but which can nevertheless be dealt 
with or employed without completely disappearing. Han Fei does not say that the 
stupidity of the people or their wicked behavior will go away; he only states that they 
can be contained by order. This is not a moral or ideal argumentation; it is a practical 
analysis of a given state of affairs. 
 
3.3 HUMAN BEHAVIOR 
 
As Han Fei proceeds to analyze human behavior in its strict sense, he says:  
 
In general, for governing well (ordering society well), it is necessary to follow the natural 
dispositions of man. Men have their likes and their dislikes, and thus rewards and 
punishments can be utilized. Since rewards and punishments can be utilized, prohibitions 
and orders can be established, and order can be achieved (the way of order materializes). 
The ruler grasps the [two] handles [of punishment and reward] in order to place himself 
in a position of power, and thus orders are implemented, and what is prohibited ceases. 
HFZ 48/142/10-11 (author’s translation)  
 
Han Fei recognizes what he calls “natural dispositions”. One might argue that 
Han Fei is speaking about human nature, but from a more fine-grained point of view, 
he does not even postulate such things, for the legalist only considers likes and 
dislikes and seems to refer to human responses to social stimuli. Even if he proceeds 
to analyze “human nature” elsewhere, Han Fei opts for a less ontologically committed 
position here and constructs a model in which human beings react to rewards and 
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punishments, the two handles of the state. By doing so, he is, once again, looking for 
a system that first explains how people react and which can then be employed 
successfully, i.e. causally. 
Yet, two further characteristics of social reasoning may be noted in this quote: 
experiments must be replicable and generalizable. Han Fei draws an abstract model of 
men that serves to explain all individuals. He is not speaking about a memorable sage, 
nor is he recounting the anecdote of a specific gentleman – instead, he takes a 
simplified abstract and makes this abstract thought a placeholder for all men. He 
generalizes in order to replicate his main idea concerning the two handles of the state. 
By doing so, he has to accept the consequence that he is open to falsification; i.e., by 
practicing social science, he has to accept the possibility of being proven wrong. This 
is also one of the reasons of his going to great lengths to prove others wrong. The Han 
Fei dedicates several chapters to the contradiction of many arguments advanced by 
the Confucians, but it is also a treatise on how to change Daoism. Han Fei is serious 
about his arguments, because he seems to know what the scholarly standard of good 
reasoning is. 
A last observation seems crucial to position Han Fei as a thinker who had 
practiced social science: He confers these two handles of the state’s general (i.e. 
almost causal) powers, and as such he accepts them as social facts. If social science 
deals with social facts, then Han Fei is an exemplar of such thinking. He conceives 
the handles not only as instruments, but as realities, for to be real is to have causal 
power.6 
 
3.4 THE METHOD OF HAN FEI’S ARGUMENT 
 
In the past three examples, Han Fei is shown as making “social-scientific” 
observations by structuring a model of argumentation, looking for empirical evidence 
for or against his model, and on the basis of the model and the evidence, providing 
policy advice to the ruler. One might object that it is relatively easy to find “social-
scientific material” in Han Fei’s vast book. A main characteristic of (practicing) 
social-science is to go beyond isolated arguments, but to be methodic in the overall 
rationale of a presentation; it is a characteristic of social science to offer thoroughly 
rational arguments. 
It is not mere coincidence that two of the above quoted sections are from Chapter 
49 of Han Fei. This chapter could be read not only as having social-scientific content, 
but as being structured analytically in such a way that its own logic points towards a 
thinker who is practicing social science. 
Chapter 9 of the Han-Fei-Zi begins with four different types of arguments. It 
begins with the stories about the nester, the kindler, and the channel builder, in order 
to make a case for the advancement of technology throughout history. Then, it goes to 
                                                
6 One might argue whether ‘causality’ is an acceptable expression and whether it does not have 
different meanings in the “East” and in the “West”. This does not seem fruitful for the aims of this 
paper, since even in so-called western philosophy there are different notions of causality. 
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a second argument; to the above-discussed man from Song. After this story, a 
parenthesis lasting from “In ancient times, husbands did not have to till the fields…” 
to “Circumstances change according to the age, and the ways of dealing with them 
change with the circumstances” is opened (Watson 2003, 98 - 100). The third 
argument begins by examining how the efficacy of the use of benevolence and 
righteousness has declined in history. After examining different patterns of ruling (by 
virtue, by charisma) and telling the story of the Duke of Ai, the fourth argument 
begins and continues to the end of the chapter: the case for laws with strong rewards 
and punishments. 
Despite the content of the chapter, it is worth noticing how Han Fei constructs it. 
By first giving an overview on how technology and rulership are interlinked and how 
they evolve in history, the Legalist makes a twofold claim; that power relies on 
certain means to steer (or control) society, on the one side, and on the other side, that 
these means have to be continually improved. Switching to the second argument, 
replicability and predictability in the employment of those means are exemplarily 
explained by showing what they are not – the rabbit running into a stump. Both 
arguments together make a bigger, more complete one. 
However, Han Fei does not rely only on this logic, but opens the mentioned 
parenthesis to explain how human society developed over time. Here, history 
provides the empirical ground for testing the sum of both arguments described above. 
In analyzing that human society lives within constraints, and that these constraints 
change society as well as human agency changes these constraints, the Legalist is 
suggesting that mankind creates facts as it evolves. Among these socially created 
facts, there are technology, relationships, systems of administration and organization 
of the society itself – and, of course, also values. 
This opens the way for the third argument, where Han Fei compares different 
styles of rulership, basically distinguishing between value or virtue-based and 
charisma-based. It is interesting, once again, to note the analytic quality of Han Fei’s 
style. He begins the chapter by linking technology to power, then making a case for a 
system that can be determined by the person holding power, and strengthening the 
convergence of both steps by showing how history unfolds. At the same time, the 
historical analysis is used to prepare the third argument: If virtue is the product of a 
social evolution (and not a natural given), then it is possible and easier to compare it 
to other products of this process and, eventually, to discard it as a guiding principle. 
Exactly this happens in the further course of this third argument. As Han Fei 
shows that values are a social creation, he treats them as a further tool to steer (or 
control) society. Without diminishing the historical efficacy of rulership by values, 
the Legalist notes that values are not as replicable and predictable as technology, i.e., 
he intends to mirror the argument he used at the beginning of the chapter. After this 
fails, Han Fei points toward the second problem with virtue: Even if virtue served 
well for administration once, social realities change and warrant new means. These 
are further exposed in the fourth argument as a solution for this problem. 
Instead of just writing about what a monarch has to do, Han Fei is extremely 
careful to construct a rational and analytic argument. Despite its content, Han Fei 
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shows many characteristics of social science, not only constructing a model and using 
empiric data – as far-fetched as it might seem – to prove the model, but by applying 
the same structure of argumentation to each claim, sorting out different pro and contra 
facts, and measuring them in the light of social reality, i.e. without further appeal to 
nature, intuition, or other instances. 
In sum, this section argues for the consideration of Han Fei as a philosopher doing 
social science. With four exemplary quotes, several of the main features that can 
count as characteristic traits of social sciences were shown to be present in Han Fei’s 
work. His thinking about human society and action is undertaken in a systematic, 
rigorous, evidence-based, falsifiable, replicable, generalizable, non-subjective, 
transparent, skeptical, rational, frequently causal, and cumulative fashion. After a 
closer look at the structure of the argument in Chapter 49, the social-scientific 
dimension of Han Fei’s thinking becomes even more plausible. Watson (2003, 11) 
unconsciously admits this as his historical introduction to the Han Fei states: “Han 
Fei wrote his essays on political science for the king of Han.” 
 
4. HOW DOES THIS MATTER? 
 
What is there to learn today from a social-scientific reading of Han Fei? There are 
several implications for philosophy in China as well as in the so-called “West”. First, 
if Han Fei is read as someone who thought about social reality as it exists 
independent from morality, cosmology, or ontology, then he would have been among 
the first philosophers to practice social science in the history of mankind. This, on the 
one hand, refutes an old cliché about Chinese philosophy as a sort of “speculative 
morality”. On the other hand, it could teach the “Western” thinker that the influence 
of social science today (see the ESRC’s definition) doesn’t necessarily make it 
irreplaceable, since Han Fei and the other Legalists were quickly quieted after their 
era. Moreover, it would show that social science could be based on different 
approaches, other than the now-dominating formal rigorism. Han Fei shows – to some 
degree, of course – how it is possible to practice social science within a narrative 
framework without giving up many of the principles that characterize its approach. 
This article itself has two readings. In a first, bold one, Han Fei is shown as a 
practitioner of social science. Of course, he would not submit to today’s techniques, 
but in the sense of a “historical correspondence”, his approach in relation to the 
scholarly standard of his time is parallel to today’s social scientific approach 
compared to our academic settings.7 But even in a second, more timid reading, this 
paper bears an important point concerning Han Fei: He at least had an intellectual 
inclination closer to social science than anyone of his generation and a long time to 
follow. Even if he was not as systematic as social science is today, in a “historical 
correspondence”, many of today’s qualities of social scientific research can be 
conferred upon him. His thinking about human society and action is done in a 
                                                
7 By Han Fei’s telling stories, even the qualitative element, present in some of today’s disciplines 
(history, anthropology) and advocated by Flyvbjerg is fulfilled. 
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systematic, rigorous, evidence-based, falsifiable, replicable, generalizable, non-
subjective, transparent, skeptical, rational, frequently causal, and cumulative fashion. 
For Chinese philosophy, and especially in the light of a constructive engagement 
with the “West”, reading Han Fei as a thinker who practiced social science has an 
important implication. Making sense of his acknowledgement of the products of 
social interaction creates a new common ground for comparative philosophy. Not 
only the comparison of cosmological, metaphysic, and moral thinking can be 
achieved – but since the common fact is given, Han Fei’s theories could be used to 
enrich “western” approaches, and vice versa. 
This article also intends to advance a technique in comparative philosophy called 
“historical correspondence”. Applying this technique, this article made the following 
claim plausible: The meaning of being a social scientist with regard to today’s 
standard of the academic discourse corresponds to Han Fei’s social philosophy in 
relation to the standard of scholarly discourse in his time. 
This “historical correspondence” allows the re-reading of a classic or ancient text 
in today’s academic context. It is, however, always a construct, meaning that it 
departs from the original text, evaluated from a scientific perspective. It does not 
mean that Han Fei actually thought like a social scientist, or even that he wanted to 
practice social science. The “historical correspondence” allows a certain type of 
interpretation by comparing two relationships: The thinker being analyzed in the 
context of his time and culture and similar philosophies/approaches today in the 
context of our time and culture. This technique enriches the methodological “toolbox” 
of comparative philosophy. This article, therefore, can be read as a case-study of the 
application of “historical correspondence”. 
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